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ABSTRACT – The main purpose of this article is to study the effect of political risk on foreign 
direct investment in the Pacific Rim. The considered time period is from 1984 to 2008. In this study, 
12 indexes of political risk offered by Political Risk Services Group have been used. After studying the 
stationarity of variables by Im-Pesaran Shin test, the benchmark model is estimated for 12 political 
risks and we come to the conclusion that the risks of Corruption, External Conflict, Internal Conflict, 
Investment Profile, and Military in Politics have significant effect on FDI. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, besides the phenomenon of globalization, foreign investment attraction has 
become one of the main concerns of developed and developing countries. Fate of national 
economies is increasingly getting connected with economies of other nations. The 
phenomenon of globalization has been the main cause of this fact and nowadays, the 
condition is so that the politicians have the less control over this matter (Lizentiatsarbeit). 
Foreign investment not only increases national product and employment, it also affects 
GNP (Gross National Product) indirectly by overflow of knowledge and technology. It is 
why the developing countries are trying like the developed countries to attract such capitals 
in the recent years. 
Dani Rodrik (1997) considers it impossible to study the miraculous development of the 
East Asia without taking into account their governments' policies in private investment. He 
proves that there is a strong correlation between good institutions and economic growth in 
Eastern Asia. It is worth mentioning that before 1980's, developing countries have not had a 
positive attitude towards foreign investment, but during the past thirty years, foreign 
investment have been increased significantly among the developing countries. 
Many factors are involved in foreign investment attraction. From among these factors are 
GDP, technology gap, wage level, agglomeration of other firms, economic infrastructures, 
tax, subside, unemployment rate, economic stability, political risk, etc.. Determinants of 
foreign investment for FDI attraction have been studied enough in different studies. In 
1990's, studies on effect of risk variables on FDI included cross-country studies (Brunetti and 
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Weder, 1998). But in the recent year, studies on FDI determinants have focused mostly on 
political issues. Political risk is such a risk in which a host government suddenly changes the 
rules of the game (Butler and Joaquin, 1998).  
Existence of disorders and irregularities in a society makes the political leaders of the 
society think about controlling these tensions; therefore, they are sometimes forced to change 
laws and regulations which itself leads to unreliability on future and the investors can not 
forecast well the future conditions.  
Factors such as legitimacy, difference in cultural and governmental rules and custom, 
fund remittance control, etc. are among the factors which increase political risk. Studies 
indicate that in countries with weak economic systems, poor enforcement mechanisms, 
ambiguous rules and regulations, corruption is observed more (Treisman, 2000). 
Political risk makes a distance between activity and aim. Since the aim of foreign firms is 
to achieve maximum profit, there is no guarantee in unreliable conditions that their activity 
leads them towards their goal. Although all investors are encountered with non-financial 
risks in their foreign investments, direction and value of investment shows high response to 
the investor's aim and political risk.  
Political risk is in relation with international trade and foreign investment. To Simmonds 
and Robock (1971), political risk is effective on national and international investment only 
when discontinuity occur in the trade environment and this discontinuity is not predictable 
and follows political changes.  
Although most of economists agree that political factors are effective on the level and 
value of FDI, they are less sue about the relationship between the nature of FDI and political 
risk and some of them are not even sure enough about direction. Therefore, this article tries 
to study the relationship between foreign investments and political risk in the Pacific Rim.  
Methodology 
Heterogeneous Unit Root Test 
To conduct co-integration test for the panel data like time series data it is necessary to 
perform stationarity test. of course, it should be taken into consideration that panel unit root 
test has higher power than time series unit root test. 
In order to consider unit root in panel data, the following autoregressive model can be 
used: 
Yit = ρ i Yit-1 + δi Xit + ε it  
where i = 1, 2, …, N indicates the countries 
and t = 1, 2, …, T stands for time. Xit indicate the exogenous variables, ρ i indicates 
autoregressive coefficient, and ε i is the error term. If ││Pi  ≤ 1, ∀ i, the considered series is 
stationary , and if ││Pi = 1, yi has unit root. LLC, BRT and Hardi unit root tests suppose that 
ρ i = ρ , ∀ i. In this scenario, Yit-1 coefficient is used for all homogeneous cross -section. But  
IPS and Fisher tests are conducted with supposition of heterogeneous coefficient meaning 
ρ i (Costantini, Martini, 2010).  
   Economic Analysis (2012, Vol. 45, No. 1-2, 74-80)
 
76
Since the economic structures of the Greater Middle East countries are independent from 
each other, we use IPS test. Im, Pesaran test for every sample of cross- section data is as 
follow:  
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wher ρ i is the number of lags in ADF regression.   
The zeo and alternative hypotheses are as follow:  
 
 
 
 
Data and variables 
The analysis we have made to study the effect of political risk on foreign direct 
investment is limited to 17* countries member of the Pacific Rim in the time period 1984-
2008. The data related to political risk has been collected from the International Country Risk 
Guide, Heritage and other data has been gathered from IMF, UNdata, UNCTAD, and the 
World Bank.  
From 1984 on, the Political Risk Services Group presented 12 indexes for political risk: 
these indexes have been degreed from 0 to 12, and higher values shows less risks (Busse and 
Hefeker 2007). 
• Government stability, called GOVST in the empirical analysis, measures the 
government's ability to carry out its policies and to stay in office 
• SOCIO quantifies socio-economic pressures at work in society that might 
restrain government action or elevate social dissatisfaction and thus 
destabilise the political regime 
• INVEST assesses the investment profile, that is, factors related to the risk of 
investment that are not covered by other (financial and economic) risk 
components, such as contract viability (expropriation), profits repatriation or 
payment delays 
• ICONFL stands for internal conflict, measuring political violence within the 
country and its actual or potential impact on governance by focusing on, for 
instance, civil war, terrorism, political violence or civil disorder 
• ECONFL weighs external conflict, namely the risk to the incumbent 
government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure, 
such as diplomatic pressures, withholding aid or trade sanctions, to violent 
external pressures, ranging from cross-border conflicts to allout war 
•   CORR assesses the level of corruption 


 =
∀=
ioneleastatfor
sisomefor
H
H
i
i
ii
0
'0
:
,0:
1
0
pβ
β
β
   
 Behname, M., FDI and Pilitical Risk, EA (2012, Vol. 45, No, 1-2, 74-80)
 
77 
• MILIT represents the influence of the military in politics, which could signal 
that the government is unable to function effectively and that, therefore, the 
country might have an unfavourable environment for business 
• RELIG measures religious tensions, stemming from the domination of society 
and/or governance by a single religious group seeking, for instance, to replace 
civil by religious law or to exclude other religions from the political and social 
process 
• LAW quantifies law and order, that is, the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system 
• ETHNIC assesses the degree of tensions among ethnic groups attributable to 
racial, nationality or language divisions 
• DEMOC relates to the democratic accountability of the government, that is, the 
responsiveness of the government to its citizens, but also to fundamental civil 
liberties and political rights 
• BUR stands for the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, which 
might act as a shock absorber tending to reduce policy revisions if 
governments change. 
Indexes themselves are correlated but each of them alone has a direct relationship with 
FDI. FDI inflow has been considered as the dependant variable. GDP per capita and 
population have been used for market measurement. The larger is the market's size, the 
easier the foreign firm sells its products. From among other variables we can mention trade 
openness, openness = X+M/GDP, infrastructure (number of telephone lines), inflation and 
tax. 
Inflation and tax are expected to have negative effect on FDI and infrastructure to have 
positive effect. But effect of openness can be negative or positive. To study the effect of 
political risk on FDI, the following model is used:  
itititititititit TAXINFRPOLINFOPEPOPFDI εβββββββ +++++++= lnlnlnlnlnln 7654321  
where Ln GDP is the logarithm of gross domestic product, Ln POP is the logarithm of 
population, Ln OPE is the logarithm of trade openness, Ln INF is the logarithm of GDP 
deflator, and Ln TAX is logarithm of tax.  
Since the Hausman test statistic is X2 = 26.3 (P = 0.00), we apply fixed –effects model 
instead of random-effects.  
Before estimating the model, we study the variables' stationarity by Im-Pesaran-Shin test 
to avoid spurious regression.  
 
Table 1. Unit root test of panel data (1984-2008) 
 
GDP FDI POP INF INFR TAX OPE 
2.13* -7.14* -5.10* -4.71* -3.12* 5.12* 6.02* 
The variables are stationary at the 5% confidence level 
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Results indicate that the variables are stationary at the 5% confidence level.  
In the benchmark equation, POL variable indicates the 12 political risk indexes. In table 2, 
12 indexes of political risk have entered the equation one by one to control regression. In 
column 1, the equation has been estimated without political risk. In this model, variables 
which have effect on FDI are GDP, POP, infrastructure and tax. We have entered each of the 
12 risks in the next columns. In column 2, government stability risk which has no effect on 
FID has been entered; but in this model, openness has become significant. In column 3, risk 
of social-economic conditions has been entered which again has no effect on FDI, and tax is 
also ineffective on FDI.  
 
Table 2. Panel analysis, country fixed-effects, 1984-2008 
 
Dependent variable: LnFDI 
 
               GOVST    SOCI    INVE    ICON   ECON   CORR      MIL  RELI     LAW     ETH    DEM    BUR 
     Indep  (1)     (2)       (3)         (4)       (5)             (6)          (7)       (8)      (9)           (10)       (11)       (12)     (13) 
    variables 
 
LnGNP     2.01*   3.2*   1.32**     2.21*    2.55*    2.31*      1.18*     2.21*   1.2*      2.12*    2.51*     2.73     2.17* 
             (3.1)  (4.2)   (2.25)    (3.13)   (5.15)    (4.12)      (3.17)    (4.1)     (3.33)   (4.11)   (3.17)     (2.59)   (4.11) 
 
LnPOP   1.12*    1.08*    1.3   0.8    0.93**     0.85*    1.1**     0.93**    0.94**      0.99**  1.02**   1.01**    0.93* 
       (2.81  (2.1)    (2.25)  (0.91)  (1.89)    (2.51)  (2.27)    (2.1)     (2.1)      (2.22)     (2.01)    (1.89)     (3.1)   
 
LnOPE     0.15  0.17*    0.27    0.31**    0.35      0.27      0.31    0.41*    0.35       0.42       0.39       0.21      0.22 
      (1.22)    (3.1)   (2.22   (1.99)    (0.95)   (1.1)    (1.31)     (2.1)    (0.91)    (1.12)   (1.1)    (0.73)    (1.1) 
 
LnINF     -0.12   -0.08   -0.13**   -0.09*   -0.14    -0.12** -0.15* -0.13** -0.10** -0.12**    -0.14   -0.16*    -1.1 
       (-1.2)      (-1.1)     (-2.1)       (-2.51)    (-1.31)   (-2.22)    (-2.91)   (-1.93)   (-2.1)    (-2.2)      (-1.4)   (-2.1)    (-1.1) 
 
LnINFR     0.03**   0.09**   0.04*    0.09     0.08**    0.1    0.07    0.11**   0.06**  0.07**   0.05     0.09      0.07** 
           (1.19)     (2.1)   (2.56)   (1.21)   (2.2)    (1.31    (1.22)    (1.98)   (2.1)  (1.81)   (1.31)  (1.1)     (1.99) 
 
LnTAX      -0.18**  -0.17  -0.18    -0.16     -0.09*    -0.15     -0.18    -0.19     -0.1     -0.09**    -1.1    -0.9     -0.1 
          (-1.99)   (-1.21)  (-1.01)  (-1.51)  (-1.89)   (-1.31)  (-1.21)  (-1.2)  (-1.25)  (-2.1)  (-0.9)  (-0.8) (-0.9) 
 
 POL      0.13    0.02    0.17**    0.08**     0.15**    0.07**   0.05**  0.09     0.15        0.09        0.04      0.14 
        (1.3)   (1.21)   (1.99   (2.1     (2.11)     (1.89)    (2.1)    (1.12)   (0.9)       (0.95)     (1.13)    (1.34) 
 
Notes: t-values reported in parentheses; * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level;*** significant at 10% 
level 
 
In the next columns, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, 
and military in politics are the risks which have effect on FDI; it means that by increase of 
such risks, the tendency towards foreign investment would be decreased. From among the 
model variables, GDP and POP have the maximum effect on FDI since the investors become 
sure that they can sell out their product if these two variables are increased. The results show 
that GDP has effect on FDI, Behname (2008, 2011a, 2011b) shows the same results. 
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Conclusion 
This article aims at studying the effect of political risk on FDI attraction. After conducting 
unit root test of Im-Pesaran and Shin, we came to the conclusion that all the variables were 
stationary and spurious regression was avoided. Afterwards, 12 indexes of political risk were 
regressed in the base equation and we concluded that the risks of investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict, corruption, and military in politics have effect on FDI and their 
increase leads to decrease of tendency towards investment. On one hand, variables such as 
GDP, POP and infrastructure lead to FDI attraction. According to the above-mentioned 
results, countries member of Pacific Rim have to take necessary decisions to decrease 
political risks. These countries should control their internal and external conflicts and 
involvements and corruption in order to be able to increase the value of foreign investments 
in their countries. On the other hand, by increasing tax, these countries may increase their 
government's income without decreasing the value of FDI very much. Another 
recommendation to these countries is that they should control economic risk or inflation. 
Such countries can control inflation and facilitate inflow of capital to their country by 
adopting appropriate monetary and financial policies.   
        
*The Pacific Rim countries in this research are: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, United States 
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Strane direktne investicije i politički rizik u Pacifičkom 
obruču 
 
 
 
REZIME – Glavni cilj rada je analiza efekta političkog rizika na strane direktne investicije u 
Pacifičkom obruču. Analiza obuhvata period od 1984 do 2008. godine. U istraživanju korišćeno je 12 
indeksa Political Risk Services Group-e. Nakon proučavanja stacionarnosti varijabli pomoću Im-
Pesaran Shin testa, izabrani model 12 političkih rizika je pokazao da rizici poput korupcije, 
unutrašnjih i spoljnih sukoba, investicionog profila i vojske u politici imaju značajan uticaj na strane 
direktne investicije. 
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